Comments What do you think?

• Carl | 16:22 19 April 2010

  The RPBs include different background disciplines in Accountancy and Law as well as different jurisdictions including England, Scotland and Nothern Ireland as well as the Insolvency Service - so actually, it is possible to see why eight might be appropriate?
  
  The profession needs to be careful, as the argument for one regulator, may be a shot in the foot, as it would reduce choice and may stiffle innovation amongst the regulators? If the profession wanted one regulator, as has been suggested by some, why is it that IPs have not chosen to all go to the same one, presumably because they want to benefit from the choice available?
  
  Personally, whilst it is easy to say eight bodies is disproportionate, I am not sure what the actual problem is? All of the delegated bodies work to the same memorandum of understanding and all the research shows that on the fundamentals, they operate to the same standards on discipline etc.
  
  I dont buy into the argument that the public find it confusing - I doubt it keeps anyone awake at night!
  
  It is only the Insolvency Service that is out of step with the seven other delegated regulators as it is also the regulator of regulators and has a very basic disciplinary regime without the power to impose financial penalties.
  
  
  
  

• John | 20:06 19 April 2010

  When is this stupid government going to learn that every non-essential change they dream up costs the poor old UK PLC un productive costs. This proposal strikes me as pretty futile, so as it is clearly not broke don't fix it.
  I hardly think the medical or legal regulators are the best examples of perfect regulation.

• Janet Watson | 17:28 20 April 2010

  My father had an old saying - "If its not broke then dont fix it". Why on earth are the OFT looking into Insolvency and Insolvency Regulation? How many more reviews do we have to endure? If anything they should concentrate on the Insolvency Service itself who is the Regulators of Regulators whilst licensing IPs themselves; they carry out the role of IPs without having to be licensed or regulated themselves; they do not require PII as they cannot be held liable for negligence; they do not require bonds for the cases as IP do; they do not even require creditors approval for their fees as IPs do; they have the monopoly over the banking of funds in Bankruptcy and Compulsory winding cases for which they charge compulsory fees; they are responsible for policy and changes in legislation and in addition to all this they are the enforcers, responsible for disqualifying directors and taking prosecutions. How many hats can one such body wear effectively? If anything the OFT should be looking at the competition issues that the above. In 1995 the spectre of privatisation of the Insolvency Service was considered but ditched by the then Government but perhaps this should be considered again.
  

• Bust | 10:57 22 April 2010

  The problem with having eight regulators is that they don't all regulate in quite the same way - there is no consistency. The argument that the Irish Insititute and Scottish Institute regulate particular populations is completely negated by the fact that the Northern Irish practitioners regulated by the Irish Insititute are actually inspected by people working for ICAS, and the ICAEW actually regulates Scottish practitioners (and are therefore familiar with Scottish law). They no longer have a reciprocal arrangement with ICAS.
  
  There is an inherent conflict of interest in a trade association (like ICAEW, IPA, ACCA etc) regulating its members where those members have other peoples' money under their control - this was tried following the 'Big Bang' in the 1980s and found to be a flawed model in the financial services industries within about 2 years of it being set up. It simply adds to the public perception of a corrupt profession, 'chaps regulating chaps'.
  
  The OFT are responding to a complaint which they regard as credible - the profession does itself no favours when 30% of SIP 16 dislcosures are inadequate in some way. This also suggests a reluctance to give creditors the sort of information they need to judge our behaviour - the old days of arrogance are at an end. We need to grasp this and do something about it, not bleat (along with the bankers) that its 'really unfair' and we should be left alone to get on with making money with as little interference as possible.
  
  Attacking the Insolvency Service as a diversionary tactic will not hold water. We should be taking on board the findings of the OFT and giving them serious consideration. Only then can we expect the public to take us seriously and only then will the public perception of insolvency practitioners change in any way.

• anonymous | 21:00 24 April 2010

  The Insolvency Practitioner Unit of the Insolvency Service should be solely in charge but subject to a total overhaul with competent people in charge !

• Roark | 09:52 26 April 2010

  The CR sector [IPs and lawyers] accounts for only some £2BN of the UK economy. There are some 1,400 IPs, probably only 700 - 800 are independently active, certainly if the 'Big 4' are taken out of the equation. The sector is massively overregulated. There are too may regulators, each of whom apply a general set of guidelines in their own way. as the sector has rolled on its back, regulation has become an industry in itself - serving little purpose than to add to the costs of the sector and further reduce the prospects for creditors. If we are serious about incresing creditor return and involvement, how about some small company insolvency rules for companies below the audit threshold?
  
  What a pity it is that the scrutiny of the regulatory processes applied in Mond V ACCA was not applied across the board. Had it been, perhaps some of those crowing on their respective regulatory dungheaps, and building their little empires, would pipe down or die of shame.
  
  It is hard enough to get creditors to prove when there may be a dividend; it is unsurprising that there is massive creditor apathy when it comes to P.51 or S.98 meetings. However creditors do have extensive remedies, other than regulator complaints, and these appear to be almost entirely redundant. Complaints from creditors remain relatively uncommon. So where is the demand?!
  
  I wholeheartedly agree with the proposal for a single regulator. The regulator should be entirely independent of the profession and centrally funded. It should not rely on membership/fines for its own income, and should have extensive powers (including fines). But let's not kid ourselves that a fine of a few thousand pounds is going to discourage some of the less scrupulous members of the profession. Inspite of some pretty damning speculation about the practices of certain practitioners, there has been a singular failure over many years to root out the seriously corrupt, possibly down to the weak finacial position of the regulators? This would certainly be addressed by a centrally funded and fully independent regulator.
  
  I hope that the above stimulates some serious debate.